Occasionalism--Godly, and not-so-Godly.

""""[Malebranche's] Occasionalism is the doctrine that all finite created entities are absolutely devoid of causal efficacy and that God is the only true causal agent. God is directly, immediately and solely responsible for bringing about all phenomena. When a needle pricks the skin, the physical event is merely an occasion for God to cause the appropriate mental state (pain); a volition in the soul to raise an arm or to think of something is only an occasion for God to cause the arm to rise or the idea to be present to the mind; and the impact of one billiard ball upon another is an occasion for God to move the second ball. In all three contexts - mind-body, mind alone and body-body - God's ubiquitous causal activity proceeds in accordance with certain general laws, and (except in the case of miracles) he acts only when the requisite material or psychic conditions obtain."""

Malebranche's doctrine may sound strange or mystical, but we contend that ANY orthodox monotheist, whether christian, jewish or muslim, must uphold Occasionalism in regards to all events, physical or mental. Even if efficient causes exist (as they do), and natural laws seem to hold, the Believer must grant that God is "the only true causal agent". Thus, theistic Occasionalism implies contingency, in a sense. God would by definition know all, command all, at all times, and everywhere. Assuming He existed, He could, if He so desired, simply reverse Newtonian physics, and have a plane fall from the sky. He could also create miracles, by definition. Yet planes don't fall, and miracles don't seem to occur, at least on macro-level. The typical theist, at least the thinking one, may allude to continuity of a sort, or say something regarding regularity, or Design, possibly a Final Cause, read instrinsically: "The rose bush always produces roses, not marigolds, or the heads of snakes. Planes fly according to those sacred Newtonian constants. There is order, which is Godly", he says. Aristotle, and Ibn Rushd, perhaps even Deists might actually agree to that--Descartes and Malebranche would not.

At the same time, God or spiritual forces do not appear to intervene during various types of nightmares--say world war, or plagues. God could have, granting the occasionalist premise, prevented trench warfare, or panzer divisions: that is assuming He thinks he made a mistake, yet Occasionalism also implies God can change His mind. But he chooses not to. Some believers insist, of course, that God does create miracles, and indeed intervene. Prayer is commonly accepted as legitimate, as bringing about change. Prayers did not stop trench warfare, however (and certainly many mothers did pray for their soldier sons). Per the law of excluded middle, it must be that miracles are possible, or they are not possible. If we grant they are possible, then it would seem an omnipotent, just God would intervene during horrible events, such as war. Yet the only time God does create miracles, they appear to be of the mystic, and somewhat trivial sort (appearance of Mary, bleeding statues, perhaps a person coming back from near-death experience etc). So God, if he can create miracles, only chooses the trivial (at least over last few centuries), and does not offer the biblical sort. And the reports of even "trivial miracles" could be mistaken testimony, or unreliable, ie bogus. Thus, that would confirm God either does not exist, OR is an amoral force: assuming He existed, He chooses to produce bleeding statues (supposedly, ie maybe), but not angels stopping panzer divisions, or preventing stalinists' from killing Kulaks.

Ergo, an omnipotent, Just God probably does not exist, since no miracles occur during horrible events or atrocity, though by definition at least, and per Occasionalism, he could bring about miracles. Barring belief in a tyrannical or demonic force, an omnipotent God most likely does not exist, and Malebranche was in error. An impersonal, non-spiritual Nature, not God, is "the only true causal agent". Many religious, and non-religious thinkers have rejected the possibility of miracles--whether of the bible, or occurring in ordinary reality. As Wl Craig says, "Voltaire's God, indeed the God of all Deists, was the cosmic architect who engineered and built the machine, but who would not be bothered to interfere in the trivial affairs of man. In this light miracles simply became unbelievable." That may be, but by doing so, doesn't Voltaire also reject the very possibility of an Omnipotent God? It would seem so (and having read Candide, I am quite sure Voltaire did intend that). Deny the possibility of miraculous intervention, and you thereby deny the possibility of a God.

Belief, Polkinghorne-style

John Polkinghorne:

"If even the omnipotent God cannot act to change the past, it does not seem any more conceivable that the omniscient God can know with certainty the unformed future. He may well be able to make highly informed conjectures about its possible shape, he may have prepared his plans for any eventuality, but in his actual experience and knowledge he must be open to the consequences of the exercise of human free will and...the evolution of cosmic free process." (Science and Providence p.90)

Dr.Polkinghorne's attempt to update theology and religious tradition via modern science and the "Open Theism" project may deserve some respect, yet we should keep in mind the slightly subversive implications of Polkinghorne's G*d modifications. Traditional theologians generally have insisted upon G*d's omnipotence and omniscience--and that holds both for orthodox and catholic thinkers, going back before Calvin to St. Augustine, if not scripture. To deny either of those attributes was considered heresy (Pelagianism, which insisted believers could earn their way into Heaven by good works, was one type of heresy--the orthodox (in those days papists) wanted to make sure that Deus always had an override right via grace---otherwise, isn't G*d limited by human concepts of morality?? Thus the dogmatist generally affirms the second part of the Euthyphro dilemma (google), which is to say, the King-G*d's not limited by our conceptions of the Good, or Just--really, that becomes a type of occasionalism...which works for christian, muslim, or jewish zealots).

Contemporary believers such as Polkinghorne ("P.") and the "open theists" now routinely modify the definition of G*d, however. P. does make mention of the theological chestnuts--including Leibniz's grand assertion of the Principle of Sufficient reason (why..somethin', rather than nada)--yet goes on to question G*d's supposed omniscience. For an agnostic, or ..atheist, that seems allowable. The bright-boy agnostic might wonder, however, whether he should grant the believer's theological modifications. Various sects now have decided define G*d as they wish, and yet still call themselves Christians (or jew, muslim, etc).

By denying the supposed G*d His omnipotence, hasn't Polkinghorne denied....His existence? Wouldn't a G*d know what will happen tomorrow, if not a year, or 20 centuries from now? And He would know by definition what His creations, humanity (and all of nature) will do, like, forever (one rather fantastic implication of omniscience), as a sinister hacker knows what his viruses will do (a believer probably doesn't care to claim G*d's a script kitty, with no understanding of the code he spits out...). P. says G*d has some idea of the future, but is not able to really know, or alter future events substantially (to what degree, Dr. P??), anymore than He can change the past. In effect those who deny foreknowledge deny his Godliness, if not grant some possible manichean, or polydeistic alternative (does some other ...Deity have some knowledge, power or part to play in reality as well??) as well. Of course, divine foreknowledge, like any species of determinism, is problematic, even absurd, as many skeptics have pointed out (tho' it may not be as problematic as...indeterminism). Bertrand Russell for one never tired of satirizing the bizarre implications of predestination, whether read as Calvinist or catholic, and the fundies never relented in their attacks on Russell. Yet Polkinghorne more or less concedes the game, and really has NO grounds to define himself as a theist.>

Non serviam.