"Many readers continue to find my position on free will bewildering. Most of the criticism I've received consists of some combination of the following claims:
1.Your account assumes that mental events are, at bottom, physical events. But if the mind is distinct from the brain (to any degree), this would allow for freedom of will.
2.You admit that mental events -- like choices, efforts, intentions, reasoning, etc -- cause certain of our actions. But such mental states presuppose free will for their very existence. Your position is self-contradictory: Either we are free to think and behave as we will, or there is no such thing as choice, effort, intention, reasoning, etc.
3.Even if my thoughts and actions are the product of unconscious causes, they are still my thoughts and actions. Anything that my brain does or chooses, whether consciously or not, is something that I have done or chosen. The fact that I cannot always be subjectively aware of the causes of my actions does not negate free will.
All of these objections express confusion about my basic premise. The first is simply false -- my argument against free will does not require philosophical materialism. There is no question that (most) mental events are the product of physical events -- but even if the human mind were part soul-stuff, nothing about my argument would change. The unconscious operations of a soul would grant you no more freedom than the unconscious physiology of your brain does.""
Sammy Skinner in the house...
More on freewill/determinism:
Or read Dr. Johnson's mot juste---a rebuttal of stimulus-response, circa 1750 or so-- a dozen times or so (as Doc Harris obviously hasn't)